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Multiple institutional and stakeholder demands have led to different strategies in the
measurement and disclosure of carbon‐related information. Although scholars
acknowledge the prevalence of competing institutional logics as being a driver of
different outcomes, existing research offers conflicting views on their implications,
thus lacking clarity. In response, this paper proposes two frameworks (a) to clarify
the institutional and stakeholder influences on carbon disclosure and (b) to depict four
different types of carbon disclosure strategies to assess a company's “true” carbon
position. We identify various concepts of institutional fields, organisations, and
stakeholders that influence disclosure and combine the two critical concepts of logic
centrality and stakeholder salience to categorise the multiple institutional and stake-
holder pressures on carbon disclosure. Whereas the first framework proposes that
institutional theory and stakeholder theory both provide, on different levels, a theo-
retical foundation to examine the influences on carbon disclosure, the second model
categorises carbon disclosure outcomes in terms of logic centrality and stakeholder
salience. Both frameworks advance the understanding of the interaction between
firm‐level agency and field‐level pressures and synthesise the current literature to
offer conceptual clarity regarding the varied implications and outcomes linked to car-
bon disclosure practices and strategies.
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Climate change is a major environmental issue of concern for the
global community and is increasingly recognised by corporate man-
agers as one of the most important business challenges in the 21st
century (Haque & Deegan, 2010). Evidence shows that multinational
companies are facing pressures from multiple stakeholders to disclose
information about their carbon‐related activities (de Villiers &
Alexander, 2014; Hahn, Reimsbach, & Schiemann, 2015; Kolk, Levy,
& Pinkse, 2008). In response to this pressure, companies have increas-
ingly implemented carbon management practices (Borghei, Leung, &
Guthrie, 2016; Herold & Lee, 2017a; KPMG, 2014; Welbeck, 2017);onlinelibrary.com/journal/bsd2however, the carbon management practices and the associated disclo-
sure strategies vary extensively between companies (Herold, 2018a;
Hrasky, 2011; Kolk et al., 2008).
The differences in organisational responses have long been sub-
ject to scholarly investigation (e.g., Adams, 2017; Besharov & Smith,
2014; Breitbarth & Herold, 2018; Delmas & Toffel, 2004; Gibassier
& Schaltegger, 2015; Herold, Manwa, Sen, & Wilde, 2016; Lee &
Herold, 2016; Luo, Wang, & Zhang, 2017; Michelon, Pilonato, Ricceri,
& Roberts, 2016; Oliver, 1991), and research often draws on the con-
cept of institutional logics to explore the implications of these differ-
ent responses. Institutional logics, according to Scott (2012), reflect
“values and norms, ideas, beliefs, and meaning systems that guide© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment 1
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provide the organising principles for an organisational field that shape
cognition and behaviour in an industry (Besharov & Smith, 2014).
In fact, the presence of carbon disclosure can be attributed to the
adoption of the sustainability logic (Herold & Lee, 2017b; Herold,
2018b; Schaltegger & Hörisch, 2015). The sustainability logic reflects
the integration of “sustainability” and “climate change” principles into
a company's value system due to a potential legitimacy gap, which
can be defined as “where corporate performance remains unchanged,
but societal expectations about that performance have changed”
(Hrasky, 2011, p. 177). In the case of climate change, the issue of global
warming heightened societal interest, and companies responded by
adopting the sustainability logic to reflect the concern about climate
change. The adoption of the sustainability logic provides actors with
templates for action, such as the implementation of carbon disclosure,
to communicate these values and convince stakeholder audiences
that the company's existence and its operations are legitimate.
Companies, however, are subject to multiple influences and thus
to multiple logics, reflecting the institutional complexity within the
organisational field, which is characterised by stakeholders with multi-
ple views and interests. For example, companies are also driven by the
logic of the market (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010). The mar-
ket logic represents a purely market driven view, characterised by an
absolute focus towards reducing costs and increasing profits, where
the sustainability logic is regarded as a trade‐off and as a problem in
regard to the pursuit of competitive advantage (Dobrovnik, Herold,
Fürst, & Kummer, 2018; Glover, Champion, Daniels, & Dainty, 2014;
Oberhofer & Dieplinger, 2014). As such, the logic of the “market”
and the logic of “sustainability” reflect different values and beliefs
within companies and are known in the literature as “competing
logics” (e.g., Lander, Koene, & Linssen, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2013;
Styhre, 2011). But although the market logic represents a central or
“core logic” (Ansari, Wijen, & Gray, 2013, p. 1017) in business organi-
sations, the position of the sustainability logic varies between organi-
sations. These two different logics and their relative influence impose
conflicting demands on organisational stakeholders and consequently
lead to different carbon management practices and disclosure strate-
gies within organisations.
Although prior studies acknowledge the prevalence of competing
logics, they are limited when it comes to describing the determinants
of stakeholder influences that lead to different organisational
responses within the same organisational field. In particular, the issue
of whether the interaction between field‐level pressures and firm‐
level influences can play an important role in carbon disclosure strate-
gies remains to be explored. In this study, we aim to fill this void. We
specifically set the following research question: How does the interac-
tion between institutional and stakeholder pressures influence carbon
disclosure strategies?
In this paper, we theorise about institutional and stakeholder
influences that lead to the adoption of logics and their implications
for organisations and institutional fields. The goal of this paper is two-
fold. First, this study will illustrate how the interaction of institutional
and stakeholder pressures can not only influence a company's carbon
disclosure on a firm level but also how these pressures can shape
organisational practices on a field level. To do so, we integratestakeholder theory into institutional theory and consolidate the critical
concepts of both theories into an institutional framework that pre-
sents the influences on carbon disclosure strategies. We argue that
institutional theory is limited to categorising the salience of stake-
holders, and the inclusion of stakeholder theory provides a theoretical
foundation that can complement institutional theory in order to cate-
gorise these influences. We identify various concepts within institu-
tional fields, organisations, and stakeholders that impact disclosure
strategies in companies.
Second, we use the main concepts in the framework to build an
integrative model that depicts four types of carbon disclosure strate-
gies. Although researchers acknowledge the importance of voluntary
carbon disclosure, the issue of the credibility of the disclosed informa-
tion remains unanswered. This inherent uncertainty, which is due to a
firm's discretion over the release of carbon‐related information, makes
it difficult to assess a company's “true” carbon position. We combine
two critical dimensions in institutional and stakeholder theory to cate-
gorise carbon disclosure strategy types on the basis of multiple institu-
tional and stakeholder pressures. The first dimension represents the
“centrality” of the sustainability logic, which describes “the extent to
which (…) logics manifest in core features that are central to
organisational functioning” (Besharov & Smith, 2014, p. 365). The
second dimension represents the “salience” of stakeholders (Mitchell,
Agle, & Wood, 1997) with regard to climate change, which is defined
here as the extent to which managers give priority to stakeholder's
carbon disclosure claims for full disclosure.
By expanding insight into the concepts and implications of institu-
tional and stakeholder influences within the organisational field, this
paper provides several important contributions to the literature. First,
we present a conceptual model, which proposes that both institutional
theory as well as stakeholder theory provide, on different levels, a the-
oretical foundation on which to examine the influences on carbon dis-
closure. This model thereby links the categorisation of stakeholder
pressures at a firm level to the outcomes at a field level that affect a
company's carbon disclosure strategy. Second, by categorising the
pressures in terms of their centrality and salience, our model proposes
four types of carbon disclosure strategies, providing an understanding
of the different corporate carbon disclosure positions. This study
thereby addresses the inherent uncertainty associated with carbon‐
related information and provides clarity about a company's true car-
bon position.
Third, the combination and the interaction of these concepts
allow the identification and categorisation of various pressures on dif-
ferent levels in order to gain an understanding of the variances in car-
bon disclosure. In this regard, the framework advances the growing
body of research on institutional complexity, which to date has been
limited in providing an explanation of the influences of individual
actors. Lastly, by categorising stakeholder influences on organisational
outcomes, our framework points to practices through which manage-
ment can exert agency to influence its preferred logics. In this respect,
we provide important insight into how stakeholder influences and
institutional logics interact in order to influence carbon disclosure
strategies, and we further develop research on competing logics by
exploring how organisations are impacted by both firm‐level agency
and field‐level pressures.
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framework that clarifies the institutional and stakeholder pressures
and discusses critical assumptions for this research. Sections 3 and 4
deal with the concepts and theories of institutional pressures. In par-
ticular, these sections discuss the adoption of carbon disclosure due
to isomorphic pressures and describe, under the premise of institu-
tional complexity, the concept of competing logics. This is followed
by the introduction of the first key dimension in categorising carbon
disclosure strategy at the field level: the logic centrality within organi-
sations. As institutional concepts are limited in describing the determi-
nants of stakeholder influences at the firm level, Section 3.3
introduces the critical concepts of stakeholder theory and the second
key dimension in categorising carbon disclosure strategies at the firm
level: the salience of stakeholders. A combination of these two key
dimensions is illustrated in Section 7, where four strategy types of car-
bon disclosure are described and presented in a model. Finally, the
conclusion highlights the contributions of this paper and discusses
future research.2 | THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present our institutional framework and the
assumptions that link institutional pressures with stakeholder pres-
sures to illustrate the impact of these influences on a company's car-
bon disclosure and the organisational field (see Figure 1). Of
particular interest for this paper is the role of institutional logics in
the field, which Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 248) define as sets of
“materials practices and symbolic constructions which constitute
organising principles and which are available to organisations and indi-
viduals to elaborate.” In other words, these “logics are the cognitive
maps, the belief systems carried by participants in the field to guide
and give meaning to their activities” (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna,
2000, p. 20), and each logic is associated with different organising
principles, and each requires a different set of behaviours from actors
(Schaltegger & Hörisch, 2015).
This description of institutional logics leads to four assumptions
that are crucial to our framework. First, we assume that carbon disclo-
sure has been institutionalised at a field level. As such, carbon disclo-
sure represents an established “social fact,” which companies take intoFIGURE 1 Institutional frameworkaccount when determining what is considered to be an appropriate
action (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977). Second, we assume
companies operate in an organisational field with similar or the same
institutional pressures—that is, the field consists of “those organisa-
tions that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institu-
tional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory
agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services or
products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148).
Third, we assume that, at a firm level, the differences in carbon
disclosure within companies are attributed to the competing logics
of the “sustainability” and “market” logic and their relative dominance.
Companies are frequently engaged in environments in which compet-
ing logics are present and thus reflect these in their organisational
practices (Kraatz & Block, 2008). The market logic assumes that com-
panies address carbon issues only if this positively affects their finan-
cial performance (Greenwood et al., 2010; Schaltegger & Hörisch,
2015). The market logic represents a core element within companies,
and pure compliance will avoid unnecessary costs for sustainability
measures such as carbon disclosure (Oberhofer & Dieplinger, 2014).
Fourth, we assume that stakeholders can influence how logics and
their organisational outcomes are shaped. On one hand, institutional
logics consist of various sets of cultural justifications upon which
stakeholders are deciding what organisational practices to support
(Friedland & Alford, 1991). On the other hand, stakeholders are con-
stantly challenging the assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules consid-
ered to be appropriate and thus play a central role in shaping
institutional logics and organisational outcomes and behaviour (Powell
& DiMaggio, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). This argument is critical
not only because it emphasises the agency of companies and stake-
holders but also because it helps to understand how stakeholders'
influences contribute to the relative dominance of logics and thus to
different carbon management practices and disclosure strategies.3 | INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES
The adoption of institutional logics can be viewed as a reaction to
multiple institutional pressures to maintain or gain legitimacy. Legiti-
macy is “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of
an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially con-
structed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman,
4 HEROLD ET AL.1995, p. 274). Organisational legitimacy can be linked to a “social con-
tract,” where organisations agree to perform various desired actions in
return for approval of its objectives, other rewards, and its ultimate
survival (e.g., Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Guthrie & Parker, 1989).
In the context of climate change, companies face a heightened
legitimacy gap and are increasingly under pressure from multiple insti-
tutions and stakeholders to reduce the negative impact on the envi-
ronment (Hrasky, 2011). In the traditional view of institutional
theory, organisations respond to this potential legitimacy gap by iso-
morphic behaviour, in particular within the same organisational field
(Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). In a single organisational field, companies
increasingly resemble each other and have converging perceptions of
how to respond to climate change (Kolk et al., 2008; Lenssen et al.,
2008). These responses, however, are not choices among unlimited
possibilities, but rather present a choice between a specific defined
set of legitimate options (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Wooten &
Hoffman, 2008). In particular, companies facing similar institutional
pressures will eventually adopt similar strategies or organisational
practices to gain or maintain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Scott, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012).
Institutional scholars argue that companies reacted to the pres-
sures arising from climate change with the implementation of carbon
disclosure, which could be related to some sort of power exerted by
the industry or which must have been based upon an already existing
successful model of carbon disclosure that can be reproduced
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Whereas the former mechanism leads to
normative isomorphism (i.e., induced by the industry), the latter—the
presence of successful models—leads towards mimetic isomorphism
(i.e., induced by competitors). Moreover, the implementation of carbon
disclosure might also be induced by regulatory pressures. These coer-
cive pressures are defined by influences carried out by those in power
—for example, through pressure from regulators and actors on which
the organisation is dependent for resources. One example of coercive
isomorphism is the influence of governmental pressure. Governments
are legitimate and usually powerful stakeholders who can exert pres-
sure through legislation, regulation, and policies (Sarkis, Gonzalez‐
Torre, & Adenso‐Diaz, 2010; Schmidt, Schneider, Rogge, Schuetz, &
Hoffmann, 2012). This pressure, in the form of “authority require-
ments” from governmental organisations, is often codified in laws
and regulations, and increasing government regulations and disclosure
requirements can be interpreted as being a threat for businesses
(Bolton & Foxon, 2015; Summerhays & de Villiers, 2012). Many previ-
ous studies suggest that increasing regulatory enforcement and grow-
ing numbers of policy guidelines on environmental protection and
disclosure create direct pressure on companies to adopt carbon disclo-
sure (Qian, Burritt, & Chen, 2015).
In industries with the same institutional pressures, the implemen-
tation of certain organisational practices such as carbon disclosure is
often related to mimetic or normative isomorphism (Delmas & Toffel,
2004; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Mimetic isomorphism occurs when
companies replicate their competitors' successful behaviour (Aerts,
Cormier, & Magnan, 2006). More importantly, institutional researchers
have found that companies are more likely to mimic the organisational
practices of other companies that are tied to them through networks,
and this indicates normative isomorphism (Guler, Guillén, &Macpherson, 2002). Normative isomorphism can be defined as pres-
sures arising from social institutions such as industry associations,
nongovernment organisations (NGOs), or media. In particular, industry
pressures appear to play a significant role with regard to carbon disclo-
sure (Kollman & Prakash, 2002). For example, senior managers in
global companies in various industry associations interacted in deter-
mining actions to be taken to mitigate climate change, making this
“issue arena” of climate change itself an important institutional influ-
ence within companies (Levy & Kolk, 2002). As a consequence, some
industry associations, such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP),
are considered by companies to be serious partners in maintaining or
gaining legitimacy (Anderies, Folke, Walker, & Ostrom, 2013; CDP,
2010; CDSB, 2014).
Other industry associations, such as the World Business Council
for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), developed guidelines for
carbon disclosure (The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate
Accounting and Reporting Standard), and the majority of the global
companies follow their guidelines (WRI/WBCSD, 2011). Delmas and
Toffel (2004) argue that the pressure to adopt these guidelines is
affected by market concentration; thus, if an industry is dominated
by a few big players, environmental practices such as carbon disclo-
sure lead to a greater degree of diffusion than it would have had the
industry been more fragmented.
In line with Rose, Mollenkopf, Autry, and Bell (2016), normative
isomorphism in combination with mimetic processes appears to have
led to a convergence in the perception of the climate issue within
companies. As a consequence, these pressures triggered the imple-
mentation of carbon disclosure in order to demonstrate to govern-
ment and to the broader community that companies are also “good
citizens” (Lee, 2012; Schaltegger & Csutora, 2012).3.1 | Institutional complexity and competing logics
The main argument of isomorphism is that corporations that face
similar institutional pressure will eventually adopt similar strategies
in order to gain legitimacy. Therefore, isomorphic behaviour can be
regarded as the critical process at the field level, illustrating why
companies implement or “institutionalise” carbon disclosure as an
organisational practice. But isomorphism has two major limitations:
First, according to this traditional notion of institutional theory, the
corporate disclosure behaviours of organisations should converge
over time, that is, no significant differences in carbon disclosure
should be observed (Cormier, Magnan, & Van Velthoven, 2005; Luo,
Lan, & Tang, 2012; Matisoff, Noonan, & O'brien, 2013). Second,
isomorphic pressures lead only to a fulfilment but not to an excess
of the requirement (Pålsson & Kovács, 2014). In other words, due to
the same institutional pressures, the disclosure of carbon‐related
information leads only to a predetermined point (the actual require-
ment). A first glance at the carbon disclosure within companies proves
the contrary, as it varies greatly in extent and detail (Herold & Lee,
2018a; Kolk et al., 2008). In particular, these two key assertions
neglect the difference in organisational responses to multiple institu-
tional demands. Isomorphism is only valid within the field to a certain
extent, and as such, the depth of response to institutional pressures,
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(Herold & Lee, 2018b; Scott, 2008).
Existing research acknowledges that organisations must fre-
quently deal with multiple demands in their environment. These
demands lead to an environment of “institutional complexity” in which
multiple logics are present and organisations are guided by different
logics at the firm level (Battilana & Dorado, 2010) or the field level
(Thornton et al., 2012), depending on the contexts in which they are
embedded. In a sustainability context, managers are constantly chal-
lenged to deal with sustainability practices while at the same time
being responsible for the well‐being of their organisation (Oliver,
1997; Schaltegger & Hörisch, 2015). Thus, different logics in a com-
plex institutional environment may impose conflicting demands on
organisational stakeholders within the field (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin,
2008; Luo, 2017). For example, in a purely market‐driven view, the
sustainability logic is regarded as a trade‐off and as a problem regard-
ing the pursuit of competitive advantages, in particular in industries
characterised by high competition and price sensitivity (Glover et al.,
2014; Oberhofer & Dieplinger, 2014).
Each logic is associated with different organising principles and is
not only influenced by diverse and multilevel political, cultural, and
social aspects but is also characterised by a distinct institutional
process and degree of determinism in shaping organisational practices
and structures (Greenwood et al., 2010). In other words, the
organisational field can be seen as being dynamic, or even as being a
“field of struggles” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97), where stake-
holders are engaged in “a war or, if one prefers, a distribution of the
specific capital which, accumulated in the course of previous wars,
orients future strategies” (Calhoun, 1993, p. 86). The organisation
field therefore becomes a locale of “institutional complexity” in
which stakeholders' relationships determine the relative dominance
of conflicting logics (Kostova et al., 2008; Luo, 2017; Wooten &
Hoffman, 2008).
The dominance of conflicting logics, such as the logic of the “mar-
ket” and the logic of “sustainability,” is influenced by their position in
the field. Within the field of business organisations, the market logic
can be considered to be a “core logic” (Ansari et al., 2013, p. 1017),
as the company's existence in a competitive environment relies on
reducing costs and increasing profits. Recently however, increasingly
stakeholders with environmental interests and powers are asking for
more transparency with regard to carbon emissions disclosure
(Hörisch, Freeman, & Schaltegger, 2014; Kolk et al., 2008). These
interests have become more powerful and more widespread in recent
years, indicating a shift of the sustainability logic to a more central
function in companies, thus challenging the dominant market logic.
As such, the influence on the company's carbon disclosure
through the increasing shift towards sustainability depends on the
extent to which the sustainability logic is integrated or central to the
organisational functioning. In other words, the closer the sustainability
logic is to the company's core function, the more it is treated as being
valid and relevant to the market logic. This positioning around a cen-
tral function in an organisation is what Besharov and Smith (2014) call
the “centrality” of institutional logics in the field, which represents our
first key function in determining the implications on carbon disclosure
within companies.3.2 | Logic centrality
The current literature suggests that companies under conditions of
institutional complexity often respond to institutional pressures by dif-
ferentiating between those pressures that are considered core tasks in
a company and those pressures that are more peripheral to
organisational functioning (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The influence of
logics depends therefore on how centrally they are positioned within
a company. Existing research in institutional theory considers the mar-
ket logic as a “core” function within any business organisation (e.g.,
Ansari et al., 2013); thus, the positioning of the market logic can be
regarded as being central to any company. The positioning of sustain-
ability logic, however, varies between companies, as the differences in
carbon management practices indicate (Herold & Lee, 2017a).
Whereas some companies have integrated climate change into
their strategy to reduce carbon emissions, others are more restrictive
in their provision of carbon‐related information and rely more on sym-
bolic management behaviour (Hrasky, 2011). The integration of cli-
mate change policies into a company's strategy indicates a closer
position of the sustainability logic to a company's core functioning,
whereas a more symbolic approach indicates a more peripheral posi-
tion of the sustainability logic. Thus, centrality is high when the sus-
tainability logic is integrated and represents a central function in a
company's operations, and it is lower when the sustainability logic is
manifest in peripheral activities not directly linked to a company's
operations.
The logics centrality can be influenced by features of the
organisational field, such as institutions and organisations.
Organisational characteristics such as a company's strategy and mis-
sion statement can interact with the field characterises that indicate
the centrality of certain logics within the company. Corporate state-
ments can be related to the concept of the institutional statement,
which Crawford and Ostrom (1995, p. 583) describe as “a shared lin-
guistic constraint or opportunity that prescribes, permits, or advises
actions or outcomes for actors (both individual and corporate).” Thus,
a mission statement can be regarded as a reflection of the corporate
strategy that situates a company in a particular location and thereby
exposes it to different logics within the field (Suddaby & Greenwood,
2005). A change in institutional pressures can also lead to a change in
mission statements in an effort to reduce uncertainty, which indicates
an increase in centrality (Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005). As such,
climate change statements may indicate the importance of the
sustainability logic and its relative position within a company (Purdy
& Gray, 2009).
For example, the mission statements on climate change of the
multinational company DHL indicate a shift of the sustainability logic
to a closer position to the company's functioning in recent years
(Herold & Lee, 2017b). In 2011, the statements DHL issued regarding
climate change stated that “carbon efficiency is (…) directly related to
(…) cost efficiency” (CDP, 2011, p. 3), indicating a focus on the market
logic (Schaltegger & Burritt, 2015). In 2013, however, the climate
change statement changed and included statements seeking an
increase in legitimacy, such as to “share (…) expertise (…) with our cus-
tomers” (CDP, 2014, p. 3), which indicates a shift to the sustainability
logic. As companies are subject to complex operations and several
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each area of expertise that increases centrality (Besharov & Smith,
2014). The change in statements regarding climate change indicates
a stronger focus on expertise in the area of carbon management and
thus represents a shift of the sustainability logic to a more central
position in the company's functioning.
Whereas the previous discussion shows that the relative position
of sustainability logic in a company's core functions influences the
extent of carbon disclosure, the current literature on institutional
logics provides only limited insight into the conditions under which
these different outcomes arise. Although existing research acknowl-
edges that stakeholders affect institutional logics (see, e.g., Greenwood
& Kamoche, 2013; Kim, Bach, & Clelland, 2007), it is limited in describ-
ing the salience of stakeholder influences within the same
organisational field, which represents our second key function in
determining carbon disclosure strategies.3.3 | Stakeholder salience
The most significant distinction between institutional and stakeholder
theory is that in institutional theory the unit of analysis is the company
itself, whereas stakeholder theory focuses on the relationships
between the company and its stakeholders. To identify the pressures
in the relationship between stakeholders and companies, stakeholder
theory provides a theoretical foundation to categorise the multilevel
and multidimensional perspectives of stakeholders (Freeman, 1983).
As such, stakeholder theory is often used to examine environmental
practices in companies, as it considers a complex business environ-
ment that is influenced by multiple stakeholders described as “any
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement
of an organisation's objectives” (Freeman, 1983, p. 46). From a corpo-
rate sustainability perspective, Stead and Stead (2013) identify a large
cadre of stakeholders with environmental interests, including share-
holders, consumers, financiers, employees, NGOs, and regulators, as
well as standard setters such as business associations. In particular,
NGOs, in concert with the media, can be regarded as having played
an important role in increasing transparency in environmental prac-
tices, as increased transparency encourages businesses and stake-
holders to jointly find innovative approaches to sustainability
(Awaysheh & Klassen, 2010). For example, the GRI reporting guide-
lines connect reporting of sustainability practices to stakeholder
engagement. The goal of this approach is not only to inform stake-
holders but also to increase exchanges between stakeholders and cre-
ate mutual interests (GRI, 2016). Examples like this shape
sustainability‐oriented mindsets and reflect the ongoing trend of com-
panies to integrate environmental practices due to heightened societal
sensibilities to climate change.
One main task of stakeholder management from a company per-
spective is to convince stakeholder audiences that the existence of
an organisation is legitimate. However, perceptions of legitimacy vary
between companies and stakeholders. Companies have to seek legiti-
macy from stakeholders, whereas stakeholders need to perceive the
company's behaviour as being acceptable in order to legitimise the
organisation (Hrasky, 2011). Managers are influenced by multiplefactors such as organisational values, principles, and strategies as well
as personal beliefs and self‐serving interpretations (Gioia &
Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). In this vein,
Santana (2012) argues that the assessment of a stakeholders' legiti-
macy is a social construction of reality, and the way a company's man-
agement perceives the legitimacy of a stakeholder may or may not be
in accordance with the stakeholder's perception of legitimacy, which
is, in turn, another social construction.
In the case of climate change, it is therefore crucial for companies
to persuade stakeholders that the company's operations are legitimate
and that it is operating in an environmentally responsible manner
(Hrasky, 2011). To do so, companies need to understand or categorise
stakeholders' claims according to their influences. Mitchell et al. (1997)
developed the most frequently used concept to define the degree of
influences in stakeholders' relations, and this concept has since been
used regularly by practitioners and research alike. We adopt their con-
cept of stakeholder salience, which is defined as “the degree to which
managers give priority to competing stakeholders' claims” Mitchell
et al. (1997, p. 854). In particular, Mitchell and colleagues argue that
stakeholder salience is a function of the stakeholder possessing one
or more of three relationship attributes: (a) the stakeholder's power
to influence the firm, (b) the legitimacy of the stakeholder's relation-
ship with the firm, and (c) the urgency of the stakeholder's claim on
the firm.
Stakeholders' power refers to the influence of those who control
the company's critical resources, which means that these stakeholders
have the power, or access to material or financial resources, to enforce
their will within the relationship. These powerful stakeholders are not
contractually bound with the company to exert pressure—for example,
through regulations and policies. The second factor, legitimacy, refers
to those stakeholders who achieve legitimacy when they have legiti-
mate claims over the company, where the basis of the legitimacy of
the relationship may derive from a contract, exchange, legal or moral
right, legal title, or at‐risk status (Hill & Jones, 1992). However, a legit-
imate claim can only be regarded as salient if the stakeholder has the
power to impose its will, or if the claim is perceived as urgent. The
third factor, urgency, is related to the level of importance and atten-
tion attributed to the claim. Mitchell et al. (1997) characterise this fac-
tor as time sensitivity (claims that need to be given immediate
attention) and necessity (claims that are vital and highly important).
Under the assumption that the sustainability logic has been
adopted, the degree of salience depends on the extent to which stake-
holders can hold companies accountable for carbon disclosure‐related
practices. To increase the salience of their claims, stakeholders may
coordinate their goals and actions with organisations that are involved
in carbon‐related information gathering, monitoring, or analysis, such
as NGOs (e.g., the CDP), business associations (e.g., the World Busi-
ness Council for Sustainable Development), and consulting companies
(e.g., auditing firms such as KPMG or PWC). Such engagement with
already legitimate and powerful organisations may lead to higher
stakeholder salience and thus to greater pressure on companies to
give priority to stakeholders' claims for full carbon disclosure (Hill &
Jones, 1992). As such, stakeholder salience is high when companies
have implemented an open and transparent approach with the aim
of full disclosure, and it is lower when stakeholder pressure is
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company's legitimacy.
The attribute of power within Mitchell et al. (1997) salience
framework, however, appears to be a crucial factor with regard to its
influence on carbon disclosure strategies. For example, the extent of
disclosed carbon‐related information in companies depends on the rel-
ative power of internal and external stakeholders. External stake-
holders' power, however, is subject to “power differentials” (Hill &
Jones, 1992), which reflects the information asymmetry between the
company's management and external stakeholders. Management has
control over the decision‐making mechanisms within the company,
which puts them in a better position to exert power over stakeholders
(Hawn & Ioannou, 2016). In other words, the company's management
can be regarded as the most powerful and the most legitimate stake-
holder of any company (Pålsson & Kovács, 2014), and that is because
the top management eventually decides on the design of the carbon
report and the amount of carbon emissions reported.
A good example to illustrate the impact of corporate decision‐
making on reported carbon emissions is the “Greenhouse Gas
Protocol: A Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised
Edition),” in which companies can choose different carbon measure-
ment and reporting schemes. These different schemes provide guide-
lines to set boundaries for carbon emissions reporting and companies
can choose between two different control approaches, namely, either
“financial” control or “operational” control. In the financial approach,
companies need only to report emissions from ventures in which they
hold more than 50% interest (WRI/WBCSD, 2011). In other words,
companies that follow the financial approach do not need to report
carbon emissions created within partnerships, if they do not own more
than 50% of the partner's company. Compared with the “operational”
approach, this may lead to less complete reporting, because when an
operational control is applied, the measurement and reporting of car-
bon emissions “is not limited to majority‐held ventures, it also applies
to minority ventures” (IPIECA, 2011, pp. 3–5). Thus, an operational
approach increases the amount of carbon emissions, as it tries to
capture emissions from the entire operational network.
Another example is a company's decision whether to outsource
services or to perform activities in‐house. This initial difference in
choosing a certain approach has a significant impact with regard to
carbon emissions disclosure purposes. Companies that use an in‐
house approach are required to report their carbon output under
Scope 1 emissions, whereas all outsourced activity falls under the
Scope 3 category, where disclosure is voluntary and thus is not a
requirement. Although institutional and stakeholder pressure may
influence and affect a company's decision about what kind of carbon
information is disclosed, both examples show that the eventual deci-
sion lies with the company's management. Our conceptual framework
depicts this process with the company as being a bottleneck (see
Figure 1), where all pressures are consolidated and filtered.
In other words, institutional pressures alone cannot provide
answers to questions about the extent to which carbon‐related infor-
mation is disclosed. Relevant internal stakeholders, in particular corpo-
rate managers, have a direct influence on a company's carbon report,
whereas external stakeholders have only indirect influence by applying
external pressure. The shift in companies towards the sustainabilitylogic to maintain legitimacy, however, puts increasing pressure on
companies to disclose relevant carbon‐related information. Thus,
these dynamics of the relationship represent a constant fight for
power between management and stakeholders outside of the com-
pany regarding the extent of disclosure of carbon‐related information.
Therefore, we argue that both dimensions—the “centrality” of the sus-
tainability logic on one hand, and the “salience” of stakeholders on the
other—are critical in determining a company's carbon disclosure
strategy.4 | TYPES OF CARBON DISCLOSURE
STRATEGIES
Taken together, the dimensions of logic centrality and stakeholder
salience provide an integrative model that allows to categorise carbon
disclosure strategies. Whereas the centrality reflects the degree to
which the sustainability logic is central to the company's organisational
functioning, the salience of stakeholders represents the extent to
which carbon disclosure claims are given priority. To establish a clear
distinction between those dimensions, it is assumed that centrality
reflects the degree of the internal dissemination of the sustainability
logic, that is, how the values and principles of climate change are
exhibited by top corporate management and how these values are
shared by organisational members to commit to common corporate
environmental goals and aspirations (Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2010).
From the perspective of the stakeholders, it is assumed that salience
represents the degree of external pressure they are able to exert
regarding climate change—that is, how much relevant carbon‐related
information is disclosed to relevant external stakeholders.
In this section, we combine these dimensions to propose four
types of carbon disclosure strategies: substantial, symbolic, transpar-
ent, and engaged. Figure 2 depicts the four types of strategies and
we elaborate on each below. We used dashed rather than solid lines
between the types to emphasise that centrality and salience are con-
tinuous dimensions and that carbon disclosure can therefore vary
between the types; however, all four disclosure types can be regarded
as useful legitimation strategies. Our framework reveals that the
extent of carbon‐related information depends on the centrality of
logics as well as on the salience of stakeholders. Our model below (see
Figure 2) describes each type and explains how each type implies a
distinct level of carbon disclosure. We illustrate our argument with
examples from the literature.4.1 | Substantial disclosure
The first type of carbon disclosure behaviour in companies exhibits
high centrality and low salience. In these companies, high centrality
positions the sustainability logic as being relevant to the company's
functioning, leading to a convergence of market and sustainability
goals. Low salience means inconsistent demands from stakeholders,
confronting companies with divergent goals and means and therefore
having little impact on the organisation. As a result, companies align
their carbon measures with the market‐driven perspective, which
results in substantial carbon emission reduction initiatives with the
FIGURE 2 Types of carbon disclosure
strategies
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type substantial.
Substantial activities reflect the corporate actions taken by a com-
pany to achieve carbon reduction‐related accomplishments in order to
reduce its carbon footprint in line with cost reductions (Hrasky, 2011;
Schaltegger & Hörisch, 2015). Because companies have a high central-
ity, the sustainability logic is integrated in their strategies, as well as in
their organisational structures, thus climate change values are shared
by all organisational members. Moreover, because these companies
face low salience, there is no need for the company's management
to include demands from stakeholders for carbon disclosure beyond
the market logic requirements. Together, these factors result in an
expectation about aligned sustainability and market goals to proac-
tively and publicly manage institutional pressures and processes by,
for example, implementing carbon efficiency initiatives to enhance
the “economic fitness” (Oliver, 1991, p. 161) of a company.
An investigation into carbon emission reduction activities from a
corporate perspective reveals that the majority of substantial initia-
tives are related to operational excellence (CDP, 2010; Oberhofer &
Dieplinger, 2014). In other words, most reductions in carbon footprint
are directly linked to improving operational efficiency and are often
expressed in form of energy‐efficiency or carbon reduction policies.
Busch and Schwarzkopf (2013) study of carbon disclosure strate-
gies in the car manufacturer industry provides an illustration how high
centrality and low salience reflect a cost‐efficiency approach. The
study found that the carbon reduction efforts could be explained by
companies seeking to achieve a competitive advantage, that is, initia-
tives to increase the company's carbon efficiency resulting in a
decrease in operational costs, informed by an alignment between the
market and the sustainability logic, thus high centrality. In contrast,
the authors found also indicators of low salience, for example, a lim-
ited engagement towards regulatory approaches, namely, the Euro-
pean Trading System (EU ETS), as the car manufacturers doubted
that activities that are simultaneously pursued by their competitors
can actually lead to a competitive advantage. Orsato (2006) proposes
that such an advantage can only be generated, if a company embarkson a unique strategy, for example, being the first to establish an envi-
ronmental management system.
Although these substantial activities indicate that a company's
carbon disclosure mirrors action, Hoffman (2006), in his analysis of
corporate climate change strategy, notes that operational efficiency
driven activities reflect the tendency of companies to pick the “low‐
hanging” fruit by disclosing easily identified low cost and/or low risk
actions without really embracing ongoing organisational adaption
strategies for climate change. Ultimately, the focus on carbon effi-
ciency initiatives indicates a company's internal decision to position
the sustainability logic as a central function, but this focus neglects
the pressure of stakeholders, leading to a potential external demand
for an increase in other carbon‐related activities in addition to pure
cost‐saving initiatives.4.2 | Symbolic disclosure
The symbolic type of carbon disclosure in companies embodies low
centrality and low salience. These companies, as in the substantial
type, have to deal with uncoordinated actions taken by stakeholders,
and thus, these stakeholders have little influence in demanding full
carbon disclosure. Unlike the substantial driven companies, however,
low centrality indicates that the sustainability logic is integrated into
the company's strategy to a lesser extent, leading to the market logic
exerting a primary influence over the company's functioning. As a
result, these companies are neither under pressure to give priority to
stakeholder claims nor to implement any carbon‐related initiatives that
lead to a reduction of their carbon footprint. However, to close the
legitimacy gap created by heightened societal concerns about climate
change, companies of this type focus on symbolic management, using
rhetorical statements designed to create an impression of environ-
mental responsibility. We therefore label this type symbolic.
Symbolic disclosure is a strategic option, which according to
Oliver (1991) can be described as “window dressing” (p. 154),
representing rather a symbolic acceptance of institutional norms,
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egy can also be related to reputation management, which Schaltegger
and Burritt (2015) describe as a company's focus on societal, political,
and media attention. Because these companies have low centrality of
the sustainability logic, carbon‐related activities and their disclosure
may be closely linked to the company's PR department to gain the
support of its most immediate audience (Hrasky, 2011). Moreover,
because these companies face low salience, management may employ
self‐interested or narcissist behaviour with claims of carbon‐related
achievements, which are not accompanied by corporate action
(Schaltegger & Burritt, 2015). Together, these factors result in low
expectations about the relevance of carbon‐related information, as
well as limiting the company's strategy and organisational structure
to the dominant market logic.
An investigation to identify rhetoric‐driven behaviour from a corpo-
rate perspective reveals that companies from a carbon‐intensive industry
sectors appear to be responding differently from those in less carbon‐
intensive industry sectors. Hrasky's (2011) study of legitimation strate-
gies in the context of carbon disclosure illustrates the symbolic type. It
was found that carbon disclosure in less intensive sectors tend to be sym-
bolic rather than representative of underlying substantial action to
reduce either the company's carbon footprint or that of thosewithwhom
it interacts. In particular, the author highlights the financial sector, which
has little motivation, and less urgent need, to take substantial action to
reduce carbon footprints, thus reflecting low centrality. Moreover, the
study illustrated, although an engagement with external stakeholders is
part of a successful climate change strategy (Hoffman, 2006), the average
carbon disclosure rate to external parties in the financial sector was six
times lower compared with all other sectors.
The author suggested a regulatory response to facilitate cooperation
with external stakeholder groups to overcome the low salience and initi-
ate carbon footprint reductions. Arguing for a market response, Smith,
Morreale, and Mariani (2008) andMarshall and Brown (2003) found that
symbolic disclosure is insufficient to promote informed decisions, so
companies eventually increase the centrality of the sustainability logic
to seek opportunities to improve their operational efficiency for
economic gains. Ultimately, a focus on symbolic strategies may neglect
market forces, leading to a potential convergence of the sustainability
logic towards the market logic for profit reasons.4.3 | Transparent disclosure
In the third type of carbon disclosure strategies, companies are
characterised by high centrality and high salience. These companies
have the sustainability logic integrated in their organisations; there-
fore, the sustainability values are reflected in their strategies and in
their organisational structures. In addition, stakeholders' claims are
given priority, as stakeholders can exert pressure to demand relevant
information. As a result, a combination of the sustainability logic as
an integrated function and the stakeholders' legitimate claim leads to
an extensive disclosure of relevant carbon‐related information. We
therefore label this type transparent.
Companies with transparent carbon disclosure strategies rely on
the assumption that climate change values and principles as exhibitedby top management will be widely shared and held by all
organisational members, leading to unity between organisational
members that fosters a sense of identity and commitment to common
corporate carbon‐related goals and aspirations (Linnenluecke &
Griffiths, 2010). Because these companies have a high centrality, the
transparency in carbon disclosure indicates full accountability, that is,
a strategic design of internal information systems to collect carbon
emissions accounting information to calculate key performance indica-
tors (Schaltegger & Csutora, 2012). From a stakeholder perspective,
high salience lead to an approach in which companies agree to
substantial changes in practices (Reid & Toffel, 2009). In the case of
carbon disclosure, this reflect actions to make carbon‐related informa-
tion accountable and comparable by the adoption of international
technical and industry procedures, following official international
guidelines (e.g., GRI).
The study of Kolk (2008) about accountability and corporate gov-
ernance illustrates high centrality and high salience using the example
of Shell. Shell was situated in a field where its core operations and
practices were infused by a sustainability logic that emphasised gover-
nance through specific board committees and internal assurance sys-
tems. For example, the sustainability report states that “executives
responsible for each Shell Business and country operation must pro-
vide annual assurance that their operations comply with our policies
and standards” (Shell, 2004, p. 8). Moreover, Shell resorts to external
verification, not only referring to international or national standards
such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) but also explaining their
reporting procedures and indicators in detail. Having been in the spot-
light of public attention since the Brent Spar incident illustrates high
salience and in turn the company's effort for more transparency and
accountability. As such, the implementation of internal oversight and
the scrutiny of external stakeholders reflects both high centrality and
high salience.
However, the combination of the sustainability logic as a central
function and the stakeholders' claim for full carbon disclosure indi-
cates that companies exhibiting transparent behaviour are also driven
by normative actions (see Hopwood, 2009; Suchman, 1995) that go
beyond pure carbon efficiency initiatives. As such, a transparent dis-
closure approach is also reflective of active external stakeholder
engagement that works on the standards and guidelines of carbon‐
related activities (UNEP/SustainAbility, 2002). Companies of this type
are engaged in public policy climate change activities and work directly
with policy makers and trade associations, as well as research organi-
sations and nonprofit organisations. Ultimately, the sustainability logic
as a central function represents the company's actions in developing
an organisational culture that reflects climate change values. More-
over, high salience represents a company's approach to give priority
to stakeholder claims that go beyond market driven initiatives, leading
to transparency and full carbon disclosure.4.4 | Engaged disclosure
The fourth type of carbon disclosure strategies in companies exhibits
low centrality and high salience. These companies have not integrated
the sustainability logic into their operations, which is thus dominated
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nies face high salience where stakeholders' goals and actions are coor-
dinated and demand the relevant information. As a result, and in
contrast with companies where the sustainability is peripheral to the
organisation's function, they have to engage in consultation with
well‐structured and well‐organised stakeholders to discuss the
company's carbon disclosure‐related practices. We therefore label this
type engaged.
Engaged companies work with stakeholders in discussing carbon
issues mainly in order to garner support of the organisation's most
immediate audiences by sharing and promoting the values that the
audience also values (Hrasky, 2011). Due to the high salience, how-
ever, stakeholders will continually demand accountability with regard
to carbon emissions, and this may include claims of adopting interna-
tional technical and industry procedures and to follow official interna-
tional guidelines. But because these companies have a low centrality,
they face an “external expectation conflict” (Oliver, 1991, p. 153),
leading only to a modification of practices more consonant with those
espoused by the stakeholders (Reid & Toffel, 2009), thus resisting
organisational adaption strategies for climate change. As such, these
companies are more active in promoting their own interests and will
devote most of its resources to appease or placate stakeholder claims
(Oliver, 1991). Together, these factors result in minimal internal
actions directed to the challenges arising from climate change.
An investigation to identify engaged behaviour has resulted in a
focus on external stakeholder engagement. Damert and Baumgartner
(2017) study of climate change strategies about the automotive indus-
try illustrates low centrality and high salience in an engaged organisa-
tion. The authors found that corporate climate action is rather linked
to reputational concerns than to compliance issues. They point out
that actions focus on end consumers, as these are more visible to
the public than those of suppliers. It therefore exhibited high salience.
From an industry view, the demonstration of initiatives on climate
change to this specific group reflects a way to legitimatise a company's
business operations and emphasises an engaged approach. In contrast,
the authors also found that climate change policies that further
upstream the supply chain are underdeveloped, indicating low
centrality.
Although companies in the substantial type proactively engage
with NGOs and business associations to reduce carbon emissions,
companies in the engaged type react and fulfil only the minimum
carbon disclosure requirements (Pålsson & Kovács, 2014). Moreover,
although the high salience indicates that stakeholders provide
conditional support and may sit on advisory panels, managers of com-
panies decide on the extent of conformity and may limit their involve-
ment in sustainability to appease stakeholders (Friedman & Miles,
2006). However, institutional demands for climate change activities
have become more powerful and more widespread and thus
deemphasise the exercise of individual agency. This agency shifts from
“actorhood to otherhood” (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000, p. 107) in these
companies may lead to lower levels of resistance to the integration of
the sustainability logic into their operations. Ultimately, climate
change pressures will lead to organisational change, with the sustain-
ability logic shifting from the periphery and becoming an integral part
within companies.5 | CONCLUSION
If institutional and stakeholder pressures affect carbon disclosure
strategies in companies, then frameworks that describes these influ-
ences and eventually categorise the strategies based on these influ-
ences expand insight into the concepts and implications and thus
advance organisational research. Although institutional theory pro-
vides an explanation of institutional pressures at a field level, it is lim-
ited in its ability to categorise stakeholders' influences on the
organisational field and on the organisation. This paper's intention
has been to overcome these limitations and build frameworks that
help to describe the interaction between stakeholders and institu-
tional influences. To provide insight into the nature of these influences
on carbon disclosure strategies, we developed two frameworks. The
first framework showed that carbon disclosure is eventually influ-
enced only by the company, but the company's decision about what
type of carbon disclosure strategy is pursued is related to the function
of stakeholders' pressure as well as to a managers' perceptions of
institutional pressure. We have clarified the conceptual and theoreti-
cal elements and processes in the organisational field and illustrated
how influences from these concepts affect a company's carbon disclo-
sure. In order to address the firm‐level influences of stakeholders on
carbon disclosure, we developed a model that combined pressure
from institutions and from stakeholders' claims. We proposed central-
ity and salience as being two key dimensions and built an integrative
model that includes four types of carbon disclosure strategies.
As such, our framework makes several contributions to the litera-
ture on institutional theory and its interaction with stakeholder theory.
First, it provides a conceptual model that shows that institutional the-
ory as well as stakeholder theory provide, on different levels, a theo-
retical foundation on which to examine the influences on carbon
disclosure. We show that stakeholders' claims at the firm level can
influence the extent of carbon‐related information, depending on the
degree to which the sustainability logic is integrated as a central fea-
ture of a company's functioning. The model also shows that institu-
tional pressure at the field level affects carbon‐related activities,
depending on the salience of stakeholders' claims. It thereby links
stakeholders' pressure at the firm level to the outcomes at the field
level that affect a company's carbon disclosure strategy. Second, the
clarification of institutional and stakeholder concepts and process with
regard to carbon disclosure advances the body of research on institu-
tional complexity, thereby expanding knowledge to enable the
categorisation of firm‐level influences that have field‐level impacts.
We showed that organised stakeholders can increase their salience
when they support institutions that monitor and analyse carbon‐
related information. This “building” of “collective governance,” in the
absence of an overarching authority, offers insight into how stake-
holders, under the conflicting logics of the market and of sustainabil-
ity, may rethink their position and shift the sustainability logic more
towards a company's central function.
Third, by categorising the pressures in terms of their centrality
and salience, our model provides a basis for understanding the varied
implications of these influences on carbon disclosure strategies. For
example, high centrality and lower stakeholder salience lead to a con-
vergence of the market logic and the sustainability logic, whereas low
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an increase in pressure with regard to climate change, this conflict may
foster change of the sustainability logic at a field level. Fourth, by
categorising stakeholders' influence regarding organisational out-
comes, our four‐type model points to practices through which man-
agement can exert agency to influence carbon disclosure strategies.
For example, our categorisation of influences shows that mission
statements and strategic decisions can create agency and influence
the relative power of stakeholders.
These findings have to be viewed in the light of the model's limi-
tations. Although our findings may be applied to other fields, the par-
ticular case of carbon disclosure might be heavily influenced by
regulations over the long term; thus, more transparency in carbon dis-
closure in the future might be reached through coercive pressure
rather than through firm‐level influences. Moreover, we assumed that
the differences in carbon disclosure are related to the conflicting logics
of the market and of sustainability. In practice, however, companies
are confronted by diverse logics and influences. We encourage future
researchers to extend our framework by expanding on other key
dimensions or logics. Companies are subject to complex processes
and multiple institutional demands. The market logic and the sustain-
ability logic are only two of many institutional logics within this
organisational field. Further research may include other logics to test
the influence on carbon disclosure.
Future research may also test the frameworks and use specific
carbon management practices from databases such as the CDP to cat-
egorise companies according to the model. In addition, this could
include datasets that provide data over a longer period, thus providing
the opportunity to examine if carbon disclosure strategies have
changed and identify the drivers behind the change. The framework
can also be used by future researchers to examine how carbon disclo-
sure strategies influence carbon emissions or how carbon disclosure
impacts financial performance. Overall, research in the field of carbon
disclosure is still in its infancy, and the industry is increasingly affected
by institutional and regulatory changes. Future research will help to
understand how these influences affect organisations.
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